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Disasters have become for most of humanity “a frequent life experience” (Bankoff 2003). A 
warming climate and less predictable weather patterns and an expanding urban infrastructure 
susceptible to geophysical hazards make the world an increasingly hazardous place even for 
those living in high income countries (HICs). It is an opportune moment, therefore, from the 
vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first century, to review the terms and 
concepts regularly employed to assess risk and measure people’s exposure to hazard to 
determine whether they are still valid. In particular, it may be useful to examine 
“vulnerability”, “resilience” and “adaptation”, the principal theoretical concepts that have 
dominated post-World War II disaster studies, from an historical perspective and to ask to 
what extent they were discourses particular to their time and place. 
That time and place was the Cold War in Europe, an ideological contest that sought to 
explain societies and their environments from the stance of competing conceptual 
frameworks and then, in its aftermath, the “triumph” of liberal democracy, neoliberal 
economics and, in recent decades, globalisation. The discourses elaborated to describe these 
decades all owe their origins to a Western intellectual tradition that casts the rest of the world 
as disease-ridden, poverty-stricken, and hazard-prone regions that were dependent on external 
medical knowledge, overseas aid, and scientific expertise (Bankoff 2001). During the Cold 
War, the non-Western world was depicted as vulnerable, and then following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, as resilient. More recently, the focus has been more on climate change 
through policies that advocate adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR) as the guiding 
principles of disaster risk management (DRM). Though all these discourses have been 
present in one form or another over most of this period, there have been notable shifts in 
emphasis that represent something of an intellectual adjustment that has rendered 
vulnerability seemingly less important as a discourse. If vulnerability helped explain how, so 
to speak, the world was rendered unsafe in the second-half of the twentieth century, why has 
the term lost favour, at least on an official level, at the turn of the twenty-first century when 
the societal and environmental conditions that inspired its formulation in the first place are, if 
anything, more prevalent?  
 
Vulnerability as a Cold War discourse 
There is no denying that the historical context was highly significant to the emergence of 
vulnerability as a discourse. The term emerged and gained validity during the 1970s, a time 




































































when the Cold War was heating up again under Ronald Reagan (Gaddis 2005). Its chief 
proponents were scholars and practitioners highly motivated by concern with the plight of 
citizens in the newly denominated Third World, and who shared a growing suspicion of the 
development policies pursued by Western governments and transnational corporations in 
these new nations. The Cold War had entrenched a militarised model of civil defence 
developed in the years following World War II that subsumed disaster management under the 
need for nuclear preparedness. NATO, for instance, established a Civil Defence Committee 
in 1951 to oversee efforts to provide protection for its citizens stating that “the capabilities to 
protect our populations against the effects of war could also be used to protect them against 
the effects of disasters” (NATO-OTAN 2001:5). However, by demonstrating that there was 
nothing “natural” about natural disasters and that people were put at risk as much by the 
political and social structures of the societies in which they lived as by any physical hazard or 
event, some scholars began to question the hitherto unchallenged assumption that the 
growing incidence of disasters was due to a rising number of purely natural physical 
phenomena. In the process, they offered a searing critique of both the means and the intent 
behind Western-led development and investment policies (O’Keefe et al 1976, Hewitt 1983, 
Watts 1993). Rather than lifting people out of poverty, the results of such programmes were 
too often to make of their life a “permanent emergency” (Wisner 1993:131-133). The 
emphasis, instead, was shifted from an agent-specific focus on an extreme event to 
consideration of what rendered communities unsafe, a condition, they argued, depended 
primarily on a society’s social order and the relative position of advantage or disadvantage 
that a particular group occupied within it (Cannon 1994, Hewitt 1997:141). The term coined 
to assess the nature and extent of this risk was “vulnerability”, where the latter is not only a 
gauge of people’s exposure to hazard but also a measure of its capacity to recover from loss 
(Chambers 1989, Blaikie et al. 1994, Hewitt 1997, Lewis 1999, Cannon 2000, Pelling 2003, 
Bankoff et al. 2004, Adger 2006). 
The purpose here is not to assess the relative merits of the term in relation to any other but 
simply to examine it historically as a product of its time and place, and the importance of the 
relative political and economic factors that underlay its conceptualisation (Cote and 
Nightingale 2012: 478). The Cold War origins of the term begin with its definition or, rather, 
the way vulnerability is applied in practice. Everybody, of course, is made vulnerable to some 
extent by a combination of variables such as class, gender, age, disability and ethnicity 
among others that affects their entitlement to command basic necessities and their 




































































empowerment to enjoy fundamental rights (Watts 1993:118-120). While the term embraces a 
wide spectrum of who is vulnerable, that turned the Indian Ocean Tsunami into a “natural 
disaster” with the single largest death toll in Swedish history, in practice, the focus is 
primarily on those with the highest degree of constant exposure to risk (Hellman and Riegert 
2009). And these people overwhelmingly live in low and middle income countries (LMICs). 
The relative vulnerability of these populations is usually defined either in terms of mortality 
or magnitude: the Bhola Cyclone of 1970 that killed an estimated half a million people in 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and still the deadliest tropical storm in world history, or the 
7.8 MwTangshan Earthquake of 1976 that flattened a city in north-eastern China causing 
approximately a quarter of a million deaths (Sommer and Mosley 1972, Yong et al.1988). 
Vulnerable people, it was apparent, lived in vulnerable places, and these vulnerable places 
principally lay in the so-called developing world and were subject to the monolithic industrial 
modernisation projects of the post-World War II era. 
This message was made clear in the most complete model proposed to explain how risk is 
generated and disasters come about. In At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and 
Disasters first published in 1994, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner 
presented the pseudo-formula risk = hazard + vulnerability to show how the measure of a 
community’s risk is directly attributable not only to the physical hazard experienced but the 
extent to which a particular social order puts people at risk. According to the Pressure and 
Release Model (PAR), vulnerability is reproduced over time: at a global level through “root 
causes” that reflect the historical distribution and exercise of power in a society that 
marginalises certain groups; at an intermediate level through more contemporary “dynamic 
pressures” that include epidemic disease, urbanization, conflict, foreign debt, certain 
economic policies and environmental degradation; and at an immediate local level through 
“unsafe conditions” that equate to a particular group’s hazardous living conditions, dangerous 
livelihoods or inadequate food sources (Blaikie et al. 1994). At the same time as offering a 
framework for linking the impact of hazards to a series of societal factors and processes that 
generate vulnerability, the PAR model exposed the processes that transformed the colonial 
territories of post-World War II into the new states of the Third World.
1
 The critique was 
unequivocal: the imperial heritage, development policies, and unequal power relationships 
rendered some communities less able to deal with disasters and left them more at risk. 
Not that everybody was affected in the same way or to the same extent. A small proportion of 
households and enterprises, more in wealthier states and fewer in less wealthy ones, did 




































































benefit from development policies and were able to protect their families and fortunes from 
the worst of human and natural excesses. To paraphrase the presidential campaign slogan of 
Democratic Party hopeful, Aldai E. Stevenson, in 1952 and later echoed by British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan, some people were safer than at any time in history and had 
“never had it so good”. A growing class of middle income-earners who were well-educated 
and politically engaged – professionals, middle managers, technicians and even unionised 
workers – were also relatively safer even if subject to the economic vagaries of globalisation 
that would eventually erode their fragile sense of security as the century unfolded. These 
groups, however, never constituted more than a small minority of the world’s population. The 
rest, the vast majority of humanity, whose lives were overwhelmingly rendered vulnerable 
and whose deaths constituted the figures in the newly compiled disaster statistics, were 
comprised of the low income populations of the Third World. These people wielded little 
political influence and had fewer entitlements. They also included a persistent if fluid section 
of First World citizens whose lives were rendered insecure by a combination of ethnicity, 
gender, class or some other factor. 
Vulnerability offered a means of critiquing developmentalism and the untrammelled pursuit 
of material prosperity that had become the dominant model of economic progress after 1945. 
Arturo Escobar refers to this conceptual ascendancy as “colonisation”, indelibly shaping 
representations of reality and constructing “the contemporary Third World, silently, without 
our noticing it” (Escobar 1995a:213). Nations were increasingly assessed in terms of their 
development or lack of it and some societies began to be regarded (and regard themselves) as 
underdeveloped, a state seen as synonymous with backwardness, poverty and, implicitly, 
vulnerability (Escobar 1995b:5). The Third World was not only disease-ridden and poverty-
stricken but it was also increasingly disaster-prone, a zone where repeated hazards inflicted 
upon people sudden death and damaging losses that left communities physically weak, 
economically impoverished, socially dependent and psychologically harmed. It also formed 
an integral part of a generalising, Western cultural discourse that denigrated large regions of 
world as dangerous (Bankoff 2001). 
Development was supposed to ameliorate the unsafe conditions and dynamic pressures that 
put people at risk. If it largely failed to do so, it was because development was too much a 
part of the root causes that underlay societies’ vulnerability in the first place. In this newly-
constructed Third World, many people began to perceive development projects such as the 
financing of dams, mines, plantations and tourist resorts that required the conversion of prime 




































































agricultural or seafront land to industrial and commercial usage as disadvantageous rather 
than beneficial (Heijmans 2004). To make way for such projects, local communities were 
often displaced without consultation, losing not only their homes, livelihoods and rights to 
cultivate land but also their identity, dignity and roots. Moreover, the increasing dependence 
of industrialised societies on fossil fuels (more than half the total oil consumed in the last 150 
years has been burnt in the last three decades) necessitated an ever-increasing expanse of land 
and the organisation of a vast workforce outside of HICs to supply its need for all forms of 
energy (sugars as well as fossil fuels) (Mitchell 2011:6, 16). It is hardly surprising that many 
environmentalist and grassroots activists in these affected countries began to talk about 
“development aggression,” a form of development in which people were neither the partners 
nor the beneficiaries of projects but rather its victims (Heijmans 2004). It was also a 
condition that rendered societies and their environments much more vulnerable to the effects 
of natural hazards.  
 
The battle over resilience and the rise of neoliberalism 
The link between development and disasters, the Cold War and vulnerability was not 
immediately apparent. Indeed, it is not an association that is often made even today. 
However, with the end of the Cold War in 1991 (and incidentally the demise of the Third 
World, at least in name), the emphasis on how societies should be viewed began to shift. 
Gradually, it was suggested that the issue of vulnerability should be turned around and 
approached from a more positive viewpoint. Societies were seen as no longer simply 
vulnerable, with all its associated negative connotations, but people began to be considered as 
primarily resilient; they had capacities to organise, resist, learn, change and adapt (Handmer 
2003). Actually, this change in thinking was already well underway influenced by the work 
of the ecologist Crawford Holling. Holling maintained that ecosystem dynamics were better 
understood not in terms of equilibrium but as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance 
while retaining the same population or state variables (Holling 1973). These same forces, it 
began to be argued, were also at work in a social context. First gaining official approbation 
with proposals for a decentralised alternative energy grid during the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
resilience thinking moved away from a qualitative assessment of why people were at risk 
towards a consideration of the available response options (Walker and Cooper 2011:153). 




































































A change of discourse was also politically advisable in the new international climate. The 
rationale behind Overseas Development Aid (ODA) initiated by President Truman in 1949 
and projects funded by the World Bank designed to contain and rollback the spread of 
Communism were no longer required. Development, in this sense, had been a continuation of 
a discourse already initiated under colonialism and refined in the debates over post-war 
compensation about the best ways to deal with poverty, often compounded by natural hazards 
and disasters. As the anti-Communist agenda receded in the 1980s and 1990s, structural 
adjustment loans, foreign direct investment and private capital flows began to replace ODA 
as the favoured development paradigm. Any debate about the relative merits of market-
oriented reform simply “expired” (Summers and Pritchett 1993:385). At the heart of the new 
approach was promoting growth by fiscal adjustments followed by facilitating 
macroeconomic stability and integration into the international economy (Easterley 2005). 
This neoliberal or strongly market-based view of post-Cold War economic integration is 
often, somewhat erroneously, referred to under the rubric of the Washington Consensus. If 
anything neoliberalism was a throwback, at least in principle, to the nineteenth century in 
terms of its heavy reliance on free market mechanisms. Under this new financial regime, 
funding was made conditional on fiscal discipline, tax reform, trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, deregulation and a reduced role for the state (Veltmeyer 2005). The consequent 
privatization of public services and infrastructure and sell-off of state assets commonly took 
place in the absence of proper regulatory safeguards, placing many services beyond the reach 
of the poor, leaving others at the mercy of substantial rises in utility charges, and rendering 
them all more vulnerable to the impact and effect of natural hazards and disasters (Hilary 
2004). 
In this new political climate, it was expedient to stress what made people resilient rather than 
what made them vulnerable (Blaikie et al. 1994, Maskrey 1989, Manyena 2006, Folke 2006, 
Gaillard 2007, Alexander 2013). This resilience was often referred to in terms of a 
community’s social capital or the manner in which a contribution freely given was expected 
to be reciprocated at an appropriate time, and by the development of group relations that 
morally enforced this code. Michael Woolcock identifies three kinds of social capital: 
bonding (ties between family, friends, neighbours and associates of similar demographic 
characteristics); bridging (ties among people from different ethnic, locational and 
occupational backgrounds but of similar socio-economic status); and linking (external ties 
with those in positions of wider societal influence) (Woolcock 2001). The role of social 




































































capital in disaster management has received increasing, if not uncritical attention (Fine 2010), 
in recent years both with regard to volunteerism in the aftermath of both major events like the 
Kobe Earthquake of 1995 or the Marmara Earthquake of 1999, and in terms of everyday 
community risks (Jalali 2002, Nakagawa and Shaw 2004, Bankoff 2015). Emphasis has also 
been placed on the importance of location in generating particular forms of associational 
activities, a geography of social capital and “a recognition that context matters to the 
outcomes of social processes” (Mohan and Mohan 2002:202). 
If vulnerability was a product of the Cold War and the conceptual framework that created the 
Third World, to what extent is resilience an “invention” of a way of thought that promotes 
and condones neoliberalism? The uncomfortable truth, as scholars have recently pointed out, 
is that the two discourses have much in common and share many policy approaches even if 
for different reasons (Walker and Cooper 2011, MacKinnon and Derickson 2012). The 
neoliberal agenda envisages a state where human well-being is best advanced by “the 
maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by 
private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey 
2007:22). To achieve these desired ends, the state only has one primary responsibility and 
that is to create the conditions that permit a fully functioning market. In this “voluntary 
state”, where the emphasis has shifted from the structural factors that cause vulnerability to 
individual responsibility and choice, all other responsibilities are labelled as “personal”. A 
resilient community is one “better able to weather its exposure to global financial markets 
through the adoption of a localised, decentralised, post-carbon, ecosystems-based model of 
growth” (Walker and Cooper 2011:155). In effect, the state devolves public safety to civil 
society and then expects the market to meet the social needs of the population. It does so by 
promoting the conditions that create wealth and then allowing the wealthy to volunteer 
assistance to those it has impoverished. This “hollowing out” of the state, however, cannot be 
achieved without the voluntary contribution of non-state actors.  
As regards disaster management, the state increasingly depended on NGOs to fulfil the public 
safety roles it wished to be divested of, if not in the immediate short-term in respect to the 
provision of emergency services, then certainly in the longer term as regards preparedness, 
mitigation, recovery and reconstruction. From the neoliberal perspective, divesting 
humanitarian assistance to NGOs was seen as a salutary alternative to funding corrupt 
governments in LMICs. Reframing the state’s responsibilities in this manner now cast 
poverty largely as a voluntarily choice: the poor chose to be poor and only had themselves to 




































































blame for being poor. Likewise, those who were vulnerable choose to be vulnerable and had 
only themselves to blame for being vulnerable (Nickel and Eikenberry 2007:536-537). 
Echoing the harsh sentence of nineteenth century Social Darwinists that condemned 
“primitive races” like the Aborigines of Tasmania to dwindle and disappear, proponents of 
neoliberalism regarded social responsibility as optional, and vulnerability as voluntary. 
“Resilient” people do not have to look to the state to secure their well-being as they have 
already made themselves secure. This “social resilience” has become a core constituent of the 
neoliberal economic agenda now expressed in terms of sustainable development and its 
prescriptions for institutional reform: “Resilience was reconceived not simply as a property of 
the biosphere, in need of protection from the economic development of humanity, but a 
property within human populations which now needed promoting through the increase of 
their ‘economic options’” (Reid 2012:72). 
The commonalities in practice between a neoliberal agenda and the shift from vulnerability to 
social resilience in DRM brought to the fore a new rhetoric that emphasised disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and focused on community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM). 
DRR or a mitigation approach began to emerge in the 1970s and has gradually become the 
most dynamic discourse in the global policy field of disasters (Hannigan 2012:130-145). If 
resilience recognised the necessity of incorporating ecological systems thinking into disaster 
management through a greater awareness of environmental and sustainable development 
issues, the priority with DRR was risk reduction and prevention through improving the 
quality and security of people’s lives by improving livelihoods and increasing social 
mobilisation. Pre-Disaster Mitigation or a programme to invest in communities prior to 
disasters was first piloted in the USA in 1997 (Project Impact) and passed into law in 2000 
(Disaster Mitigation Act 2000) (McCarthy and Keegan 2009). Its international ascendancy 
can be noted in the five Priority Actions identified in the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action 
(UN 2005), and, more recently, in the four Priorities for Action agreed upon in the 2015 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction that formally recognised the responsibility of 
local government, the private sector and other stakeholders alongside that of the state in 
reducing disaster risks (UN 2015).
2
 
On the ground, the means by which DRR was translated into action was through CBDRR. 
CBDRR claims to offer an effective and sustainable approach to disaster reduction through 
empowering people to tackle the underlying problems of poverty, marginalisation, 
environmental degradation and political abuse (World Bank 2001). Its distinguishing feature 




































































is its emphasis on participatory processes in disaster management, capacity building among 
the people affected, removal of the root causes of vulnerability, and the mobilization of the 
less vulnerable sectors in support of those with needs (Heijsman and Victoria 2001: 13-18). 
In the Philippines, for example, NGOs have become increasingly involved in DRM and have 
integrated mitigation and preparedness into their existing operations. Starting with traditional 
relief and charity activities, such organisations foster community capacities to reduce 
vulnerability. At the same time, existing development organisations have expanded their 
programmes to incorporate disaster management capabilities, and specific NGOs have 
formed in direct response to actual disaster events to carry out integrated relief and 
rehabilitation work (Luna 2001: 219-220). In this sense, DRR with its emphasis more on 
community-based practices is only rediscovering that people with local knowledge and 
expertise are the principal resource of their community. As Andrew Maskrey succinctly 
observed 25 years ago “only local people know their own needs and therefore only they can 
define their own priorities for mitigation, within a given context” (Maskrey 1989:87).  
Participatory approaches to DRR, however, have not always proven to be the panacea they 
were once hoped to be and have also been suborned by the World Bank and other multi-
lateral lending institutions to serve a neoliberal agenda. Participating approaches were 
initially held up as a major counterbalance to the power of the dominant development 
discourse and to give a voice to the poor (Chambers 1997). But as participation was 
increasingly written into development projects both as a method of delivery and even as an 
intended outcome, it has become “wholly compatible with the liberalisation agenda, and poor 
people’s voices carefully marshalled to provide support for the Bank’s policy prescriptions” 
(Williams 2004:558). Instead of local knowledge shaping development projects, they are 
often in fact shaped more by locally dominant groups and by the project’s own interests. 
Rather than people participating in agency programmes, it is the other way round to ensure 
consistency with project-defined models. What David Mosse calls the “ventriloquization” of 
villagers’ needs (Mosse 2001:24). That is participatory approaches serve the dual purpose of 
both de-politicising the question of poverty and shifting the responsibility for the project’s 
success away from the administrating agency onto the participants (Williams 2004:564-565). 
Even if CBDRR acknowledges the need for local participation and acknowledges the 
structural causes in disasters, it is communities who are ultimately still responsible for 
improving their capacity and addressing the risks. 




































































Although by different routes and for very different intentions, neoliberalism and social 
resilience end up advocating much the same approach by much the same methods. They both 
emphasise an active citizenship whereby people take responsibility for their own social and 
economic well-being, and they both share a general distrust of centralised state systems and a 
desire to decentralise responsibilities. The emphasis is on local capacity, local decision-
making, local responsibility and, of course, local funding. To one, however, this championing 
of civil society is a way to disguise the imposition of market discipline, part of a state-
building agenda that, far from empowering people, is a means of exercising “governance 
from a distance”. Jonathan Joseph even claims that resilience thinking’s individualist focus 
on risk is above all an Anglo-Saxon discourse intent on promoting institutional reforms in the 
interests of global capital (Joseph 2013). To others, however, resilience is a continuing 
critique of existing international development and aid that, far from shedding its Cold War 
agenda, only found new vitality in the policies and programmes associated with the 
Washington Consensus. The continuing notion that “natural disasters” are simply a sign of 
underdevelopment and that the poor suffer disproportionately during such events because of 
their underdevelopment was bitterly attacked. In the wake of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, for 
instance, trust in this principle was used to support the argument that economic development 
was the best answer to disasters in Nicaragua (Rocha and Christoplos 2001:246). Ben Wisner 
decried the “phantom decentralisation” in neighbouring El Salvador whereby central 
government responsibilities were decentralised to local agencies without funding or resources 
to implement them. Despite the encouraging rhetoric that acknowledged community 
resilience and claimed to be supporting local capacity-building, the government’s post-Mitch 
recovery plan “produced vulnerabilities that affect all but the very richest” and was nothing 
more than “run-away capitalism justified by neoliberal ideology” (Wisner 2001: 261). Naomi 
Klein has gone further and claimed that neoliberalism, even if it does not promote disasters, 
certainly profits from them through the marketisation of emergency assistance, a process she 
aptly names “disaster capitalism” (Klein  2007). 
Resilience is no less a Western discourse than is vulnerability: it recasts the world according 
to culturally-specific dictates. Depending on the context in which it is evoked, resilience 
either tries to restructure non-Western societies according to prescribed economic formulae 
or it looks for salvation in the social structures of traditional communities that it defines to its 
own intent. All too often, however, it is a profoundly conservative discourse. Resilience as 
expressed through state policy can be used to mask inequalities and social differentiation 




































































within societies, absolving the state of its duty of care and implicitly accepting capitalism as 
an immutable force akin to the power of Nature (MacKinnon and Derickson 2012:258). As a 
critique of the status quo, CBDRM often exalts existing social relations within communities 
and denies the state a legitimate role in promoting change in society. In either case, it is, as 
Muriel Cote and Andrea Nightingale suggest, “a power-laden framing that creates certain 
windows of visibility on the processes of change, while obscuring others” (Cote and 
Nightingale 2012:484-485).  
  
Globalisation and the “turn” to adaptation 
The all but disappearance of Communism and the rise of neoliberalism in the last quarter of 
the 20
th
 century prepared the way for the integration of economies, industries, markets and 
cultures on a truly global scale. This new network society is both informational and global: 
informational because increasingly all aspects of society and culture are integrated as a result 
of the Information Technology Revolution, and global because productivity, consumption 
and the circulation of capital, labour, raw materials, management and markets are organised 
worldwide (Castells 1996). The process of globalisation, of course, has been taking place for 
hundreds of years but has speeded up and diversified enormously over the last half-century. 
Previously confined to mainly economic matters, the term now includes activities such as 
technology, media and culture. It is the ultimate realisation of neoliberal thinking expressed 
on a global scale but, as Naomi Klein writes, globalisation was never simply about trading 
goods across borders more freely. Rather, it is an ideological project “to lock in a global 
policy framework that provided maximum freedom to multinational corporations to produce 
their goods as cheaply as possible and sell them with as few regulations as possible – while 
paying as little in tax as possible” (Klein 2015:19). 
In this new political era, the existential threat is no longer Reds under the beds or the public 
sector of nation states but is climate change, itself the product of unfettered capitalism 
(Leichenko and O’Brien 2008). Overwhelming scientific evidence now supports the 
conclusion that human activity is changing the climate and will continue to affect it for 
hundreds if not thousands of years to come even if there are no further emissions of 
greenhouse gases. World temperatures have fluctuated in the past. However, it is estimated 
that at no time in the past 650,000 to 800,000 years have concentrations of water vapour, 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, chlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons  




































































in the atmosphere been so high as they are today (Giddens 2014:12, World Bank 2015:16). 
While sceptics remain, challenging both the validity of the science (Lomborg 2001) and its 
ideological underpinnings (Bell 2011), the current debate is more about the nature of climate 
change. Whether it is a gradual process that will allow human societies and economies 
sufficient time to adjust to the new conditions, or whether it is non-linear, whereby crossing 
some threshold will precipitate sudden and catastrophic change (Lovelock 2006). There is 
little that can be done in the latter case apart from ensuring that this tipping point is not 
reached by reducing the output of emissions into the atmosphere. Alternatively, if climate 
change is relatively slow, then individuals and societies will have time to adapt given the 
necessary inducements and incentives (Szerszynski and Urry 2010:1-2). There may even be 
some economic advantages to reap in such a process as, for instance, envisaged by improved 
seaborne communications in an ice-free Arctic Ocean (Patel and Fountain 2017). The key 
concept in this new discourse is climate change adaptation.  
Adaptation as a concept, however, is also a contested domain. This recent turn in discourse 
heralds yet another conceptual power struggle between Western governments, financial 
institutions and multinationals, and LMICs over how to shape the future (Pelling 2011:3). 
Unlike vulnerability and resilience, however, adaptation is very much a top-down rather than 
a bottom-up concept largely conceived and implemented by the UN and international 
organisations. Its definition and application are fought over in much the same way as were 
vulnerability and resilience. As the increase in greenhouse gas emissions began to be taken 
seriously by governments and scientists, an international treaty was signed in 1992, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in which countries 
acknowledged that adverse changes in the climate were “a common concern of humankind” 
(UNFCC 1992). The UN also established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to provide an objective, scientific view of climate change, its political and economic 
impacts, and the options available for mitigation and adaptation. Revealingly, the IPCC 
describes adaptation in terms of the need for an “adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2007).  
As so stated, adaptation is defined as an inherently conservative activity that functions to 
preserve the status quo rather than encourage more radical solutions that might threaten 
existing social and political systems. In one sense, this is hardly surprising given its 
provenance in a UN system itself beholden to the nation states that fund its institutions and 




































































agencies, and the banking and corporate interests that manipulate the policies and interests of 
national governments (Pelling 2011:11). Adaptation’s preoccupation with climate science, 
whether the intensity of storms will increase, how high sea levels will rise, to what extent 
floods will become more frequent, runs the risk of blaming Nature once more for disasters 
and returning to an older hazard-focused paradigm that ignores how such events are socially 
as well as physically constructed. This is an all too familiar trope that seeks to render large 
parts of the world as vulnerable by blaming the poverty of these regions squarely on natural 
forces and disasters on people’s lack of resilience. It is part of the conceptual vocabulary of 
neoliberalism that evokes a social Darwinist ethic implying that those who do not adapt are 
not fit to survive. “It burdens and blames the victim”, according to Jesse Ribot, “by devolving 
the onus of adjustment to the organism or affected unit” (Ribot 2011:1160). It also serves to 
diffuse the opprobrium that might otherwise be directed at an economic system created by, 
and until recently, largely benefiting western industrialised nations by making declarations 
that stress the common plight of humanity and by focusing on scientific and technical 
discussions about purely climatic and scientific phenomena (Bankoff 2001).  
In particular, there is an unwillingness to recognise that the overdevelopment of the 
industrialised West had been at the expense of the underdevelopment of the rest of the world 
whose peoples are now expected to pay an inordinate share of the socio-environmental 
consequences of the resultant changes in climate. In 2013, a group of Pacific island nations 
led by Palau came close to asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion 
on the responsibility of historic emitters for global warming. They only refrained from 
pursuing a claim because they were advised to wait until the science made for more 
irrefutable evidence (i.e the 2014 IPCC report). In the same year, 132 LMICs staged a walk-
out at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Warsaw because Western countries 
tried to block all talk about “loss and damage” compensation for the consequences of global 
warming until after 2015 (Weymouth 2013). Employing rhetoric very reminiscent of Cold 
War sentiments, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott even referred to his country’s carbon 
tax, imposed by a previous left-of-centre government, as “basically socialism masquerading 
as environmentalism” (Vidal 2013). Rather than being a unifying issue around which 
humanity might rally in the face of a common challenge, climate change is as divisive as any 
Cold War discourse though the geographical fracture lines are now more likely to be depicted 
as North-South rather than East-West. The threat is also global, even if it disproportionately 
affects more equatorial regions. 




































































Moreover, climate change is often used as a scapegoat to explain the causes of natural 
hazards and occlude the true nature of disaster (Kelman and Gaillard 2008; Mercer 2010). 
While climate change is clearly an important driver of certain types of hazards, especially 
hydrologically related ones such as floods and extreme weather, it is too often used as an 
excuse to focus on natural explanations rather than social ones (Kelman et al. 2016). This is 
what Ribot calls drawing attention to the who are vulnerable rather than the why they are 
vulnerable question. The latter is too socially and politically contentious to address and most 
government agencies and development organisations invested with climate policy prefer to 
pursue policies that maintain existing structures and relationships. That is adaptation is 
conceived and implemented in such a manner that most projects preserve rather than 
challenge the status quo (Pelling et al 2015). Based only on published research, the IPCC 
reports are largely “a product of negotiated content between science and governments” and 
rarely risk alienating the political and technical decision-makers on whose support it depends 
(Pelling 2011:37-38). Consequently, as disasters are attributed solely to climate change, 
global institutions, following the UNFCCC’s lead, craft adaptation funds to redress only the 
“additional” damages produced in this manner, limiting liability and avoiding all 
consideration of the root causes of what made people vulnerable to climatic variations in the 
first place (Ribot 2014:670-672). The talk once again is about what makes people resilient 
and the discourse on adaptation is focused on how to maintain what existed before. Such 
attitudes remain prevalent among influential policy institutions such as the UNISDR and ODI 
(Kelman et al. 2016:S133). 
Of course, adaptation need not be depicted in this manner and the threat of climate change 
can raise profound questions about existing paradigms of development (Godfrey-Wood and 
Naaess 2016). Mark Pelling identifies three levels at which adaptation can influence 
development: adaptation to build resilience through implementing changes that do not 
question the underlying assumptions or power asymmetries in society; a transitional stage of 
adaptation that encourages only incremental changes in rights and responsibilities without 
advocating a fundamentally different regime; and transformational adaptation that advocates 
radical reform to the political and economic systems and the cultural discourses on which 
they are based. While he is careful not to favour any one form of adaptation, arguing that no 
level is intrinsically more desirable than another, it is clear that the challenges posed by 
climate change demand more radical solutions than simply the resilience favoured by the 
UNFCCC and IPCC (Pelling 2011). Such advocacy is anathema to hard-core conservatives 




































































who prefer to deny that climate change is even real from fear of opening the door once again 
to massive state intervention and regulation of the market (Klein 2015:40). 
 
Conclusion 
During the Cold War, vulnerability offered a needed critique of development policies that 
emphasised growth rather than “purposeful development” (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 
2010:623-626). After 1991, the increasing stress placed on resilience signified a shift away 
from the extent to which socio-economic systems exposed people to different levels of risk to 
a perspective that emphasised how human actions made it possible for social-ecological 
systems to survive. Vulnerability remains a significant consideration in these discussions if 
for no other reason than it is an adverse effect on social-ecological resilience: loss of a 
community’s social capital, it is recognised, makes people more vulnerable (Adger 
2006:269). The neo-liberalism that dominated the decades following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was able to suborn the public and academic discourses surrounding resilience to 
varying degrees by championing individual choice and personal responsibility. In the process, 
vulnerability was rendered an almost voluntary condition, one that was mainly the result of 
poor individual decisions. Adaptation, as it is presently conceived and implemented through 
the UNFCCC and the IPCC, is shown to be little more than a form of resilience in another 
guise though, like the latter, it too has the potential to be a conduit for more radical change. 
Moreover, there is also a complementarity between climate and capitalism in that both share 
an endless cycle of disturbance and crisis as permanent states. The present focus on climate 
change and the need for social adaptation runs the risk of reducing the latter to a choice freely 
made by individuals, communities and states. As Terry Cannon and Detlef Müller-Mahn 
deftly point out, for many, being “risk adverse” in the present is actually nothing more than a 
neoliberal concern with “profit maximisation” in the longer term. How society best adapts to 
climate change is effectively reduced to a question of how far growth can continue while 
limiting the most serious environmental consequences and even profiting from the economic 
opportunities that arise. Nor is there any guarantee that people made fully aware of the perils 
of climate change will respond by adopting risk reduction measures and behaviours (Cannon 
and Müller-Mahn 2010:627).  
All three discourses are tainted in one respect: they are all culturally specific to Western 
perspectives, and they all view the world and its problems from an ethnocentric standpoint.  




































































Both vulnerability and resilience, as this discussion has shown, are discourses which 
originated at a particular historical juncture. Their meaning was shaped by a particular 
historical perspective and their significance can really only be understood through a 
consideration of the way power operated at the time in the prevailing socio-environmental 
systems. If vulnerability expressed a profound unease with the developmental model that 
dominated the Cold War era and that depicted natural hazards as largely physical events for 
which there were mainly technical solutions, then the subsequent discourse of resilience fitted 
well with pre-established neoliberal ideas about competition and entrepreneurship that 
viewed disasters after the collapse of Communism as largely the result of individual choice. 
The current emphasis on adaptation as a trope implies accepting a world in which disturbance 
and crisis are constant features whether caused by climate change and/or social upheaval. It is 
also one where there is a continual need for neoliberally-sanctioned discourses about 
resilience and change. It accepts disaster as an endemic condition in anticipation of which 
society must remain in a permanent state of high alert. It is also a profoundly conservative 
discourse that largely obscures questions about the role of power and culture in society, and 
about whose environments and livelihoods are to be protected and why (Cote and Nightingale 
2012:484-485, Krüger et al. 2015). 
There seems no escape from remaking the world again and again after a particular cultural 
image. No rival discourse seems ready yet to challenge Western hegemony in the language 
and metaphor of international governance and development policy. Accordingly, disasters 
remain inherently political events “because they pose questions about who should be allowed 
to re-compose the world and how” (Guggenheim 2014:4). That these discourses are mainly 
conservative and inherently protect western interests is not unexpected given the historical 
context in which they evolved. Only vulnerability offers a critique of existing power relations 
and the status quo but its import was blunted by the end of the Cold War and the new focus 
on resilience. Adaptation, too, has not so much been subverted by a neoliberal agenda as it 
has been largely conceived in its likeness and has been mainly implemented by its 
instruments and agencies. If the stress in HICs is increasingly on the need for adaptation and 
necessary adjustment as the only really practical measure, what, in effect, makes societies 
more resilient, for those in LMICs, the issue still remains much more about what renders 
them vulnerable, more especially as that condition is seen as largely imposed by the West on 
the rest (Bankoff and Borrinaga 2016). “Rather than seeking causality in social history”, 




































































Ribot concludes, “adaptation becomes a necessary adjustment to the droughts, floods or 
storms that are directly attributable to climatic events” (Ribot 2014:671).   
Examining these dominant discourses as products of the historical forces which gave them 
birth exposes the underlying values and norms that continue to shape our world and reveals 
how we chose to frame the future. Unfortunately, the power relations that underlie these 
discourses have not changed significantly since World War II as the world has been largely 
remade again and again according to an image fashioned by certain sectors in Western 
societies. Only a continuing emphasis on the root causes that make people vulnerable, on how 
power relations operate in society to place some people more at risk than others, on the 
importance of culture to community resilience, and on how adaptation provides an 
opportunity for a radical change in the way human societies operate can a similar fate be 
prevented and history made to stop repeating itself – yet again. 
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1 I use such terms as “Third World”, “First World”, “less-developed”, “developing” and “developed” where they 
are appropriate to the context in which they were used at the time. 
2
 The five priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action are: ensuring that DRR is a national and a local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for implementation; identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and 
enhancing early warning; using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience 
at all levels; and reducing the underlying risk factors and strengthening disaster preparedness for effective 
response at all levels. The four priorities for action of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction are: 
understanding disaster risk; strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; investing in disaster 
risk reduction for resilience; and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back 
Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
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